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ABSTRACT
A portable civilian GPS spoofer is implemented on a dig-
ital signal processor and used to characterize spoofing ef-
fects and develop defenses against civilian spoofing. This
work is intended to equip GNSS users and receiver man-
ufacturers with authentication methods that are effective
against unsophisticated spoofing attacks. The work also
serves to refine the civilian spoofing threat assessment
by demonstrating the challenges involved in mounting a
spoofing attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the U.S. Department of Transportation assessed
the U.S. transportation infrastructure’s vulnerability to
civil GPS disruption [1]. Their report, known as the
Volpe report, warned that “[a]s GPS further penetrates
into the civil infrastructure, it becomes a tempting target
that could be exploited by individuals, groups, or countries
hostile to the U.S.” Among other types of interference, the
report considers civil GPS spoofing, a pernicious type of
intentional interference whereby a GPS receiver is fooled
into tracking counterfeit GPS signals. Spoofing is more
sinister than intentional jamming because the targeted re-
ceiver cannot detect a spoofing attack and so cannot warn
users that its navigation solution is untrustworthy. The
Volpe report noted the absence of any “off the shelf” de-
fense against civilian spoofing and lamented that “[t]here
also is no open information on ... the expected capabil-
ities of spoofing systems made from commercial compo-
nents.” It recommended studies to characterize the spoof-
ing threat: “Information on the capabilities, limitations,
and operational procedures [of spoofers] would help iden-
tify vulnerable areas and detection strategies.”
Seven years later, civil GPS receivers remain as vulnerable
as ever to this threat. In a recent informal survey con-
ducted by the authors, four manufacturers of high-quality
GPS receivers revealed that they were aware of the spoof-
ing vulnerability, but had not taken steps to equip their re-
ceivers with even rudimentary spoofing countermeasures.
The manufacturers expressed skepticism about the seri-
ousness of the spoofing threat and noted that countermea-
sures, if required, had better not be too expensive. Such
attitudes invite further examination of the spoofing threat
and of practical spoofing countermeasures.
Important research into spoofing countermeasures has
been carried out over the last decade. The Volpe report
cites an internal memorandum from the MITRE Corpora-
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tion in which the author, Edwin L. Key, appears to have
examined spoofing and spoofing countermeasures in detail
[2]. The memorandum recommends the following tech-
niques for countering spoofing:
1. Amplitude discrimination
2. Time-of-arrival discrimination
3. Consistency of navigation inertial measurement unit
(IMU) cross-check
4. Polarization discrimination
5. Angle-of-arrival discrimination
6. Cryptographic authentication
Techniques 1 and 2 could be implemented in software
on GPS receivers, but the techniques would be effective
against only the most simplistic spoofing attacks. Tech-
niques 3-5 would be effective against some—but not all—
more sophisticated attacks. In particular, angle-of-arrival
discrimination, which exploits differential carrier phase
measurements taken between multiple antennas, could
only be spoofed by a very sophisticated coordinated spoof-
ing attack (to be discussed in Section II). However, tech-
niques 3-5 require additional hardware, namely, multiple
antennas or a high-grade IMU, whose cost militates against
their widespread adoption.
Cryptographic authentication, Keys’s technique 6, has
been studied in some detail in the years since the Volpe
report [3–5]. GNSS researcher Logan Scott offers several
levels of authentication in his 2003 ION GPS/GNSS pa-
per [3] and urges their prompt adoption in a recent article
on the subject [6]. Scott’s methods are backward compat-
ible with non-compliant GPS receivers. Spreading code
authentication, which is the basis for Scott’s Level 2 and
3 authentication, entails embedding messages in the GPS
ranging codes and periodically authenticating these mes-
sages. Because this method effectively binds a digital sig-
nature to the ranging codes, it would render a compliant
receiver practically impervious to a spoofing attack except
during the short interval between reception and authenti-
cation of the embedded messages.
Unfortunately, the techniques offered by Scott all require
modification of the civil GPS signal structure. For compre-
hensive authentication, one of the L2C, L5, or L1C signals
on Block IIF and Block III GPS satellites would have to
be altered to incorporate the embedded messages. Such
changes appear extremely unlikely in the short term be-
cause, as one experienced observer noted, “signal definition
inertia is enormous” [7]. A less effective but more practical
approach over the U.S. would be to authenticate only the
WAAS signal, which is managed by the U.S. Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration.
Since the WAAS signal is constructed on the ground and
transmitted via “bent pipe” communication spacecraft, it
is more amenable to immediate modification. Even so, ef-
forts to persuade WAAS officials to adopt spreading code
authentication have so far proven fruitless (Logan Scott,
private communication).
The Homeland Security Institute, a research arm of the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has also consid-
ered the threat of civil GPS spoofing. On its website it
has posted a report listing seven spoofing countermeasures
[8]. (This is, incidentally, the first hit that surfaces in an
internet search on “GPS spoofing” at the time of writ-
ing.) The proposed countermeasures include techniques 1,
2 and 3 from Keys’s list above. Among the remaining four
countermeasures are techniques that would be trivial to
spoof. None of the seven techniques would adequately de-
fend against a sophisticated spoofing attack. Nonetheless,
the posting claims that its proposed techniques “should
allow suspicious GPS signal activity to be detected.” The
authors of the present paper worry that such optimistic
language in such a prominent posting will mislead many
readers into believing that the spoofing threat has been
adequately addressed.
The goals of the present work are to provide a refined as-
sessment of the spoofing threat and to develop and test
spoofing countermeasures that are practical and effective.
The authors have concluded that to advance these goals
it was necessary to go through the exercise of building a
civil GPS spoofer. The process of developing a complete
portable spoofer allows one to explore the range of prac-
tical spoofing techniques. By this exercise, one discovers
which aspects of spoofing are hard and which are easy
to implement in practice. With this information, the diffi-
culty of mounting a spoofing attack can be more accurately
assessed and receiver developers can prioritize their spoof-
ing defenses by choosing countermeasures that are effective
against easily-implementable spoofing techniques.
Software-defined GPS receivers are a natural platform for
the study of civil spoofing and its effects. In a software
GPS receiver, the real-time correlators, tracking loops, and
navigation solver are all implemented in software on a pro-
grammable processor. The current authors have pioneered
some of the efficient correlation techniques and other im-
plementation strategies that have enabled the development
of capable PC- and DSP-based software receivers [9–12].
The spoofer described in this paper is a software-defined
civil GPS receiver-spoofer.
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections.
These are listed here for ease of navigation:
II: Initial Spoofing Threat Assessment
III: Receiver-Spoofer Architecture
IV: Implementation and Performance
V: Demonstration Spoofing Attack
VI: Spoofing Countermeasures Suggested by Work to Date
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VII: Conclusions
II. INITIAL SPOOFING THREAT ASSESS-
MENT
The goal in designing secure systems is to brace a system’s
weakest link against foreseeable attacks [13]. One begins
by identifying likely modes of attack—those that easily ex-
ploit the system’s obvious vulnerabilities—and considering
defenses against them. Such is the goal of this section.
Consider the spoofing threat continuum illustrated in Fig.
1. To facilitate a threat analysis, the continuum is roughly
divided into simplistic, intermediate, and sophisticated
spoofing attacks.
Spoofing Threat Continu m
Simplistic Intermediate Sophisticated
Commercial signal
simulator
Portable software 
radio
Coordinated attack by
multiple phase-locked spoofers
Fig. 1. The spoofing threat continuum: simplistic, intermediate,
and sophisticated spoofing attacks.
A. Simplistic Attack via GPS Signal Simulator
As far as the authors are aware, all stand-alone commercial
civilian GPS receivers available today are trivial to spoof.
One simply attaches a power amplifier and an antenna to
a GPS signal simulator and radiates the RF signal toward
the target receiver. A successful attack along these lines
was handily demonstrated by researchers at Argonne Na-
tional Laboratories in 2002 [14] (see also the discussion at
http://philosecurity.org/2008/09/07/gps-spoofing).
Despite the ease of mounting a spoofing attack with a sig-
nal simulator, there are some drawbacks. One is cost: the
price of modern simulators can reach $400 k. Simulators
can be rented for less than $1 k per week, which makes
them accessible for short-term mischief, but long-term use
remains costly. Another drawback is size. Most GPS sig-
nal simulators are heavy and cumbersome. If used in the
simplest attack mode—situated close to a target receiver’s
antenna—a signal simulator would be challenging to plant
and visually conspicuous. Of course, if the custodian of
the target receiver is complicit in the spoofing attack—as
is the case, for example, with the fishing vessel skipper who
spoofs the onboard GPS-based monitoring unit to fish un-
detected in forbidden waters—the conspicuousness of the
signal spoofer is irrelevant.
The menace posed by a simulator-based spoofing attack is
diminished by the fact that such an attack is likely easy
to detect. This is because of the difficulty of synchro-
nizing a simulator’s output with the actual GPS signals
in its vicinity. An unsynchronized attack effectively acts
like signal jamming, and may cause the victim receiver to
lose lock and have to undergo a partial or complete re-
acquisition. Such a forced re-acquisition would raise sus-
picion of a spoofing attack. If the unsynchronized attack
somehow avoids causing loss of lock, it will nonetheless
likely cause an abrupt change in the victim receiver’s GPS
time estimate. The victim receiver could flag jumps of
more than, say, 100 ns, as evidence of possible spoofing.
The spoofer can attempt to counter this defense by inten-
tionally jamming first and then spoofing, but an extended
jamming period may be required to sufficiently widen the
target receiver’s window of acceptance, and extended jam-
ming is itself telltale evidence of interference.
In summary, the ease of mounting an attack via GPS signal
simulator makes this attack mode relatively likely. Mer-
cifully, detecting such an attack appears also to be easy.
Of course, the mere fact that a simulator-type attack is
easy to defend does not increase security. A gaping vul-
nerability will remain until civil GPS receivers at least are
equipped with the rudimentary spoofing countermeasures
required to detect a simulator-type attack.
B. Intermediate Attack via Portable Receiver-
Spoofer
One of the challenges that must be overcome to carry out
a successful spoofing attack is to gain accurate knowledge
of the target receiver antenna’s position and velocity. This
knowledge is required to precisely position the counterfeit
signals relative to the genuine signals at the target an-
tenna. Without such precise positioning, a spoofing attack
is easily detected.
~1 m
Spoofing
Transmitted
Signal
Received
Signal
Received
GPS Receiver/Spoofer Target GPS Receiver
Authentic
Spoofed
Correlation Function
Signal
Fig. 2. Illustration of a spoofing attack via portable receiver-spoofer.
An attack via portable receiver-spoofer, portrayed in Fig.
2, overcomes this difficulty by construction. The receiver-
spoofer can be made small enough to be placed inconspic-
uously near the target receiver’s antenna. The receiver
component draws in genuine GPS signals to estimate its
own position, velocity, and time. Due to proximity, these
apply approximately to the target antenna. Based on these
estimates, the receiver-spoofer then generates counterfeit
signals and generally orchestrates the spoofing attack. The
portable receiver-spoofer could even be placed somewhat
distant from the target receiver if the target were static
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and its position relative to the receiver-spoofer had been
pre-surveyed.
Each channel of the target receiver is brought under con-
trol of the receiver-spoofer as illustrated in the inset at the
upper right of Fig. 2. The counterfeit correlation peak is
aligned with the peak corresponding to the genuine signal.
The power of the counterfeit signal is then gradually in-
creased. Eventually, the counterfeit signal gains control of
the delay-lock loop tracking points that flank the correla-
tion peak.
As one might imagine, there are no commercially available
portable receiver-spoofer devices. This of course decreases
the present likelihood of the receiver-spoofer attack mode.
Nonetheless, the emergence of software defined GPS re-
ceivers significantly erodes this barrier. As will be demon-
strated subsequently, the hardware for a receiver-spoofer
can be assembled from inexpensive off-the-shelf compo-
nents. The software remains fairly sophisticated, but it
would be unwise to assume it was beyond the capabili-
ties of clever malefactors. The civil GPS signal structure
is, after all, completely detailed in a publicly available in-
terface control document [15], and entire books have been
written on software-defined GPS receivers [16]. In perhaps
the most worrisome scenario, anticipated in Ref. [3], the
software definition of a receiver-spoofer may someday be
available for download from the Internet. The expertise
required to download and exercise the code would surely
be within the reach of many potential malefactors.
An attack via portable receiver-spoofer could be difficult
to detect. The receiver-spoofer is able to synchronize its
signals to GPS time and, by virtue of its proximity to
the target antenna, align the counterfeit and genuine sig-
nals. A target receiver equipped with a stable reference
oscillator and a low-drift IMU (for receivers on dynamic
platforms) could withstand an attack via receiver-spoofer
for several hours. Eventually, however, a patient receiver-
spoofer would gain undetected control by keeping its per-
turbations to time and position within the envelope al-
lowed by the drift rates of the target receiver’s oscillator
and IMU.
The only known user-equipment-based countermeasure
that would be completely effective against an attack
launched from a portable receiver-spoofer with a sin-
gle transmitting antenna is angle-of-arrival discrimination.
With a single transmitting antenna, it would be impossible
to continuously replicate the relative carrier phase between
two or more antennas of an appropriately equipped target
receiver.
In summary, an attack via portable receiver spoofer is not
presently likely because such a device is not readily avail-
able. However, the emergence of software-defined GPS
receivers increases the future likelihood of such an attack.
Furthermore, this mode of attack could defeat most known
user-equipment-based spoofing countermeasures.
C. Sophisticated Attack via Multiple Phase-locked
Portable Receiver-Spoofers
The angle-of-arrival defense against a portable receiver-
spoofer can be thwarted by a coordinated attack with as
many receiver-spoofers as antennas on the target receiver.
Imagine a receiver-spoofer the size of a pack of cards—
small enough to mount directly atop a target antenna. The
receiver-spoofer’s receiving and transmitting antennas are
situated respectively on the upper and lower faces of the
device and are shielded to avoid self-spoofing. Now imag-
ine several such devices sharing a common reference oscilla-
tor and communication link, with each device mounted to
one of the target receiver’s antennas. The angle-of-arrival
defense fails under this attack scenario.
Naturally, this attack inherits all of the challenges of
mounting a single receiver-spoofer attack, with the addi-
tional expense of multiple receiver-spoofers and the addi-
tional complexity that the perturbations to the incoming
signals must be phase coordinated.
The only known defense against such an attack is crypto-
graphic authentication.
In summary, an attack via multiple phase-locked portable
receiver-spoofers is somewhat less likely than an attack via
single portable receiver-spoofer, but may be impossible to
detect with user-equipment-based spoofing defenses.
D. Target Spoofer Type
The foregoing discussion of the spoofing threat contin-
uum suggests that a spoofing attack via GPS signal sim-
ulator poses the greatest near-term threat. However,
there are known effective defenses against such an attack
and these can be implemented in software on commer-
cial GPS receivers. In contrast, an attack launched from
one or more portable receiver-spoofer(s) poses the greatest
long-term threat. Known user-equipment-based defenses
against such attacks are few and of limited effectiveness.
Accordingly, focus will be directed in this paper toward
the portable receiver-spoofer attack mode. To better un-
derstand this mode, a software-defined portable receiver-
spoofer has been built as a research platform.
III. RECEIVER-SPOOFER ARCHITECTURE
The software-defined receiver-spoofer that has been devel-
oped is an extension of the Cornell GRID receiver [12]. A
spoofer software module and transmission hardware have
been added. A top-level block diagram of the receiver-
spoofer is shown in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Block diagram of the receiver-spoofer architecture.
A. Receiver Module
The receiver hardware of the receiver-spoofer consists of
a Zarlink/Plessey GP2015 RF front end, a CPLD for sig-
nal multiplexing (not shown), and a Texas Instruments
TMS320C6455 DSP. The receiver software that runs on
the DSP is similar to that described in [12] except that it
now includes a full navigation solution engine. The soft-
ware is entirely written in natural-language C++, which
facilitates code development and maintenance.
The software correlation engine, which is based on the
bit-wise parallel correlation technique introduced in Refs.
[9] and [11], is crucial to meeting real-time deadlines in
the receiver-spoofer under the simultaneous burdens of re-
ceiver processing and spoofing. Accordingly, an overview
of the bit-wise parallel technique is given here. For other
details on the receiver module, the reader is directed to
Ref. [12].
Figures 4, 5, and 6 are meant to facilitate explication of
the bit-wise parallel correlation technique. Figure 4 de-
picts the standard correlation operation that occurs within
any GPS receiver. The incoming signal x(t) is mixed by
complex multiplication with a complex local signal replica,
xl(t). The product is integrated over a short interval (typ-
ically 1-20 ms) and sampled to produce the quadrature
baseband components Ik and Qk, also known as baseband
accumulations.
(local signal replica)
(received signal)
Standard Correlation Operation
xl(t)
∫
tk
tk−1
( )dt
∗ rk = Ik + jQkx(t)
Fig. 4. Standard correlation operation. The local signal replica xl(t)
is complex and ⊗∗ denotes complex multiplication.
Figure 5 depicts a byte-wise software implementation of
the standard correlation operation. In this implementa-
tion, the individual signal samples are stored in 8-bit bytes.
Because many DSPs and general-purpose CPUs are capa-
ble of performing several multiply-and-accumulate opera-
tions in parallel (e.g., 8 in high-performance TI fixed-point
DSPs), the byte-wise implementation can be quite compu-
tationally efficient. However, storing the local carrier and
code replica samples as bytes makes the tables in which
they are packed for efficient table look-up prohibitively
large for storage in on-chip (fast) memory. Furthermore,
despite its computational efficiency, the byte-wise imple-
mentation is still only one-quarter to one-half as fast as the
bit-wise parallel implementation when implemented on a
high-performance fixed-point DSP.
...
(real)
(imag)
Byte−wise Implementation
...
...
ik∑
i=ik−1
( )
∗ rk = Ik + jQk
xl(ti)
x(ti)
Fig. 5. Byte-wise implementation of the correlation operation.
Boxes in the signal trains represent bytes, each of which stores an
8-bit signed representation of the signal x or of the complex local
replica xl. Grayed boxes represent the operands of one complex
multiplication operation.
Figure 6 depicts the bit-wise parallel correlation imple-
mentation. As implemented on the receiver-spoofer, the
bit-wise parallel correlation operation assumes the incom-
ing signal and the local signal replicas are quantized to two
bits—one sign and one magnitude bit. The sign and mag-
nitude bits are packed into 32-bit words. Explicit complex
multiplication is replaced by a combination of the bit-wise
logical operations AND, NOR, and XOR. In effect, the bit-
wise parallel method performs 32 multiply-and-accumulate
operations in parallel. Importantly, storage of the local
carrier replicas as bit-packed sign and magnitude words is
also memory-efficient, which makes on-chip storage of the
local signal replica look-up tables possible.
B. Spoofer Module
Beyond the hardware required for the GPS receiver, the
receiver-spoofer requires only signal transmission hard-
ware: a D/A converter, a frequency synthesizer and mixer
for mixing to near the GPS L1 frequency, in-line atten-
uators, and a transmission antenna. For the present pa-
per, no over-the-air tests were conducted (to avoid possible
FCC violations); hence, the transmission hardware will not
be discussed further.
The heart of the spoofer is the spoofer software module,
which is shown in greater detail in Fig. 7. The main
components of the spoofer module are described in the
following subsections.
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B.1 Control Module
The spoofer’s control module coordinates a spoofing attack
by directing the frequency, code phase offset, and signal
amplitude applied in each of n spoofing channels. Some
components of the control module described below remain
under development.
The control module accepts the following inputs from the
receiver module: the estimates {tˆk}n1 of the start times of
the kth C/A code period on receiver channels 1-n; the esti-
mates {θˆk}n1 of the beat carrier phase on receiver channels
1-n at times {tˆk}n1 ; the estimates {fˆD,k}n1 of the Doppler
frequency shift on receiver channels 1-n at times {tˆk}n1 ; the
estimates {Aˆk}n1 of the signal amplitudes on receiver chan-
nels 1-n at times {tˆk}n1 ; and the receiver-spoofer’s current
3-dimensional position P and velocity V .
The control module orchestrates a spoofing attack in the
following way. It begins by commanding n spoofer chan-
nels to generate signals with Doppler frequency offsets
equal to {fˆD,k}n1 and code phases whose relative align-
ment is equivalent to that dictated by {tˆk}n1 . It then ap-
plies a common-mode code phase advance to compensate
for buffering delays within the receiver-spoofer. If this ad-
vance is chosen correctly, then each spoofing signal will be
code-phase-aligned with its genuine-signal counterpart at
the target receiver’s antenna. The control module then
commands an increase in the signal amplitude of one or
more spoofer channels to effect lift-off of the target re-
ceiver’s tracking points. This continues until all target
receiver channels are presumed to be under control of the
spoofer.
At this point the control module gradually leads
the target receiver off its true position and time
to an alternate position or time. Let ∆xD(tk) =
[∆vx(tk),∆vy(tk),∆vz(tk),∆b˙(tk)]T be the perturbation
that the control module applies to the target receiver’s ob-
served velocity and clock rate bias at receiver-spoofer time
tk. The time rate of change of the perturbation ∆b˙(tk)
must be less than the expected drift rate of the target
receiver’s reference oscillator. Likewise, the time rate of
change of the velocity perturbations ∆vx(tk),∆vy(tk), and
∆vz(tk) must be less than the accelerations that the tar-
get receiver expects, or, if the target receiver is equipped
with an IMU, less than the expected uncertainty in the
accelerometer bias.
To enforce ∆xD(tk), the control module linearizes the
standard Doppler frequency measurement model about the
current receiver time, position, and velocity estimates and
computes offsets to the quantities {fˆD,k}n1 that are com-
mensurate with the perturbation ∆xD(tk).
Similarly, let ∆x(tk) = [∆x(tk),∆y(tk),∆z(tk),∆t(tk)]T
be the perturbation that the control module applies to the
target receiver’s observed position and time at receiver-
spoofer time tk. ∆x(tk) is calculated by integrating the
time history of ∆xD(tk) values from some initial condi-
tion, typically ∆xD(tk) = 0 so that the target receiver’s
observed velocity and clock rate bias is initially approxi-
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mately equal to its true velocity and clock rate bias. To
enforce ∆x(tk), the control module linearizes the stan-
dard pseudorange measurement model about the current
receiver time and position estimates and computes offsets
to the quantities {tˆk}n1 that are commensurate with the
perturbation ∆x(tk).
Following the above strategy, the control module can, as
gradually as necessary, misdirect the target receiver’s ob-
served position and time.
The spoofer control module currently makes no attempt
to align the beat carrier phases of its output signals with
those of the received GPS signals, and so the phase values
{θˆk}n1 are currently discarded. More sophisticated future
versions of the receiver-spoofer will likely make use of these
phase values.
B.2 Spoofer Channels
Each of the n spoofer channels is configured to correspond
to one of the n authentic GPS signals that the receiver
module tracks. The signal generated by the nth spoofer
channel can be modeled as
xn(τi) = An(τi)dn(τi)Cn(τi − tn,k) (1)
×Q {sin [2pifIF τi + θn(τi)]}
θ˙n(τi = tn,k) = fD,n,k (2)
where xn(τi) is the ith sample of the signal, τi is the time of
the ith sample, An(τi) is the control-module-commanded
amplitude at τi, dn(τi) is the data bit value that applies
at τi, Cn(τi− tn,k) is the C/A code chip value that applies
at τi, tn,k is the control-module-commanded start time
of the kth C/A code period, Q{·} is a 2-bit quantization
function, fIF is the intermediate frequency, θn(τi) is the
beat carrier phase at τi, and fD,n,k is the control-module-
commanded Doppler frequency shift at time tn,k. The C/A
code function Cn(τ) can be further represented as
Cn(τ) =
1023∑
j=1
cn,jΠTc(τ − jTc) (3)
and the data bit function dn(τ) as
dn(τ) =
∞∑
j=−∞
dn,jΠTd(τ − jTd) (4)
where {cn,1, cn,2, ..., cn,1023} and {dn,j , dn,j+1, ...} are the
unique C/A code chip sequence and navigation data bit
sequence corresponding to the GPS satellite whose signal
is being emulated on the nth spoofer channel, Tc and Td are
the duration of one C/A code chip and one navigation data
bit, and ΠT (τ) is the usual rectangular support function
equal to unity over 0 ≤ τ < T and zero otherwise.
To generate the C/A code samples {Cn(τi)}, i = 1, 2, ...,
the spoofer channels make use of the same bit-packed C/A
code replicas that are employed for signal correlation in the
receiver module, which are stored in large look-up tables.
However, to generate the samples of the quantized carrier
replica
Q {sin [2pifIF τi + θn(τi)]} , i = 1, 2, 3, ... (5)
the spoofer channels cannot exploit the same bit-packed
carrier replicas that are used for signal correlation in the
receiver. This is because, to minimize on-chip memory
requirements, the receiver’s carrier replicas all begin at
the same phase value and have only a coarse 175-Hz fre-
quency resolution. The receiver compensates for these fac-
tors by performing a rotational “fix-up” on the in-phase
and quadrature accumulation values. Unfortunately, such
a scheme is unworkable for generating the sampled carrier
replicas in the spoofer channels because anything less than
precise phase and frequency control over the carrier repli-
cas would potentially alert a target receiver to a spoofing
attack. Consequently, it was necessary to develop a car-
rier replica generator more capable than that used in the
receiver module.
B.3 Carrier Replica Generator
Two requirements drove the carrier replica generator de-
sign: precision and efficiency. Regarding precision, to
evade detection the generator must be able to set the initial
phase of a carrier replica segment to within approximately
one degree and the Doppler frequency offset over the seg-
ment to within approximately 1 Hz. Regarding efficiency,
to meet real-time deadlines the generator would have to
be capable of generating a replica segment Ts seconds long
in less than Ts/30 seconds.
A generator was developed that met these requirements.
An overview of the generator is given here. Details are
provided in Ref. [17].
A quantized sampled carrier replica can be represented in
bit-wise parallel format as a block of 32-bit words. In the
simplest case, the carrier replicas are one-bit quantized
with 0 and 1 respectively representing the values -1 and 1.
The carrier replica generator can be configured to generate
1- to 4-bit-quantized samples. Two-bit quantization was
chosen for implementation within the spoofer, with one
bit representing the sign and the other representing the
magnitude of the signal. The choice of 2-bit quantization
balanced a tradeoff between efficiency and the amount of
quantization noise introduced into the final linear combi-
nation of the spoofer channel outputs.
The carrier replicas are sampled at a rate fs > 2fIF Hz as
shown for the minimum and maximum Doppler frequency
shifts in Fig. 8. The key observation that makes real-time
generation of the carrier replicas possible is the follow-
ing: There is little diversity in the 32-bit words that result
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from packing 32 samples of quantized carrier replicas over
a ±10-kHz range of Doppler frequency offsets and 2pi ra-
dians of carrier phase. This is another way of saying that
the information content of the quantized sampled carrier
replicas is low, which is to be expected.
Figure 8 illustrates this concept by showing a case with a
sampling frequency fs = 5.714 MHz, an intermediate fre-
quency fIF = 1.405 MHz, and a Doppler frequency range
of ±10kHz. This Doppler frequency range covers the ex-
pected range of Doppler shifts seen by a terrestrial GPS
receiver, with ∼5 kHz of margin for receiver clock rate
error. The sampling and intermediate frequencies are typ-
ical for civil GPS applications. Over the interval shown
in Fig. 8, the total number of cycles for the two signals,
whose initial phases are aligned, differs by less than 1/8
of a cycle. When sampled and 2-bit quantized into the
sign (s) and magnitude (m) bits that run along the bot-
tom of each frame, the resultant carrier replicas have the
same sign-bit history and only 10 different magnitude bits.
This indicates that the sampled carrier replicas covering a
reasonable Doppler shift frequency range are primarily a
function of the initial phase offset for each 32-bit word.
This observation remains true whenever fIF < fs and
fD,mabs << fIF , where fD,mabs is the maximum absolute
value of the Doppler frequency shift.
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Fig. 8. Two-bit quantization of the local carrier replica at the max-
imum and minimum Doppler frequency shifts.
The low information content of the sampled carrier repli-
cas makes them amenable to tabular storage and effi-
cient retrieval. Two tables are required, one each for the
sign and magnitude bits. Let if ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nf − 1} and
iθ ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nθ − 1} represent the respective indices into
the frequency and phase dimensions of the tables. For
each carrier replica segment (typically 1-ms long), a single
frequency index is calculated as
if = round
(
fD − fD,min
fD,max − fD,minNf
)
(6)
where fD is the exact desired frequency and fD,min and
fD,max are the minimum and maximum Doppler frequency
shifts. The phase index iθ is different for each of the 32-
bit words that are strung together to compose the carrier
replica segment. Let τk be the time offset of the midpoint
of the kth word in the segment relative to the time of the
first sample in the segment. The phase at the midpoint of
the kth word is calculated as
θmid,k = mod [2pi(fIF + fD)τk + θ0] (7)
where θ0 is the phase of the first sample in the segment,
and the modulo operation is modulo 2pi. Finally, the phase
index of the kth word is calculated as
iθk = round
(
θmid,k
2pi
Nθ
)
(8)
To meet precision requirements, the number of indices into
the frequency and phase dimensions of the tables were set
respectively to Nf = 32 and Nθ = 256. With this table
size, the table-generated carrier replicas are not signifi-
cantly different from carrier replicas generated by apply-
ing the exact phase and frequency values using double-
precision computations. The sign and magnitude tables
occupy a total of 64 kB in on-chip memory.
B.4 Data Bit Predictor
The GPS L1 navigation data bit sequence {dn,j , dn,j+1, ...}
required by the nth spoofer channel is most easily gen-
erated in one of two ways. The simplest approach is to
pass data bits to the spoofer channels as soon as they can
be reliably read off the incoming GPS signals. Naturally,
this approach results in a delay in the arrival time of the
spoofing data bit as compared to that of the true data
bit at the target receiver’s antenna. The delay is most
conveniently made an integer number of 1-ms C/A code
intervals. Clearly, such a delay is undesirable in a spoofer
because a target receiver could be designed to watch for
such a delay and thereby detect a spoofing attack.
The second approach is to predict the data bits based on
knowledge of the bit structure and a recent bit observation
interval. This is the function of the receiver-spoofer’s data
bit predictor. This method relies on the fact that the GPS
navigation message has a 12.5-minute period and remains
nearly perfectly predictable for a period of two hours.
In fact, the almanac component of the 12.5-minute data
block is refreshed by the GPS Control Segment only once
per day, and the remaining data—the individual satellite
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ephemeris data—can be observed in less than one minute.
There are data bit segments within the TLM word of the
navigation message that are unpredictable on a regular ba-
sis. However, these segments are also unpredictable for the
target receiver (in the absence of external data bit aiding).
Therefore, the spoofer can simply fill the unpredictable
data bit segments with arbitrary data bits and adapt the
parity bits and HOW word polarity accordingly.
Discrepancies have been observed between the almanac
data of Block IIA and later satellites. For example, the
least significant bits of particular ephemeris parameters
can differ. This is believed to be a rounding error in early
satellites. These discrepancies cause problems with data
bit prediction for Block IIA satellites. The GPS control
segment has been alerted to this and is taking corrective
measures. Meanwhile, the spoofer module’s data bit pre-
dictor keeps two copies of almanac data: one for Block IIA
and one for later satellites.
During a spoofing attack, rising GPS satellites pose a chal-
lenge for the data bit predictor; indeed, for the entire
receiver-spoofer. The receiver-spoofer must prevent the
target receiver from acquiring bit lock on the new signal
until the data bit predictor has a chance to observe the new
satellite’s ephemeris data. This could be done by trans-
mitting a spoofing signal with arbitrary data bits whose
boundaries change sporadically by an integer number of
C/A code periods.
B.5 Sample-wise Combination of Spoofer Channel Output
Signals
Combination of the bit-packed signals generated in each of
the spoofer channels is performed sample-by-sample. The
ith sample from the nth spoofer channel is weighted by
An(τi) and summed with the corresponding samples from
the other spoofer channels, each weighted appropriately.
While computationally expensive, sample-wise operations
are necessary to generate a combined signal that represents
a quantized superposition of the individual spoofing signals
with correct relative amplitudes. The composite signal is
then re-quantized to 1 or 2 bits before being loaded into
the output circular buffer. Re-quantization of the com-
posite signal introduces additional signal distortion, which
decreases the carrier-to-noise ratio of each component sig-
nal. For 1-bit re-quantization, which is the current config-
uration, the signal distortion is tolerable until more than
8 spoofing signals are combined. More precisely, 1-bit re-
quantization can sustain no more than 8 equal-amplitude
component signals at a carrier-to-noise ratio of C/N0 = 48
or higher.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE
The software-defined receiver-spoofer has been imple-
mented on the Cornell GRID receiver platform shown
Real-time Receiver-Spoofer
Fig. 9. The Cornell GRID receiver – the hardware platform for the
receiver-spoofer.
in Fig. 9. The core processor on the latest version
of the GRID receiver is a 1.2 GHz Texas Instruments
TMS320C6455 DSP. Both the receiver and spoofer soft-
ware modules run on the same processor.
When tuned for efficiency, the receiver-spoofer meets real-
time deadlines with computational resources to spare. At
full capability, the receiver-spoofer tracks 12 GPS L1 C/A
signals and simultaneously generates 12 spoofing signals, in
addition to performing a 1-Hz navigation solution and con-
tinuous background acquisition. As mentioned in Section
III-B.5, the 1-bit re-quantization of the composite spoofing
signal limits the spoofer module practically to 8 component
signals. Future versions of the receiver-spoofer may trade
computational resources for 2-bit re-quantization, permit-
ting more than 8 component spoofing signals.
The marginal computational demands of each tracking and
spoofing channel are respectively 1.2% and 4% of the DSP,
the latter value reflecting the high computational cost of
carrier replica generation and sample-wise signal combina-
tion within the spoofer module.
The core Cornell GRID receiver software is the product
of hundreds of developer-hours of work. Developing the
spoofer module and extending the core GRID receiver soft-
ware to include it required a team of three experienced
developers working approximately 40 hours apiece, or ap-
proximately three developer-weeks. The hardware compo-
nents of the receiver-spoofer platform shown in Fig. 9 are
all off-the-shelf components whose total cost is approxi-
mately $1500.
V. DEMONSTRATION SPOOFING ATTACK
The following method was devised for demonstrating a
spoofing attack without actually transmitting RF signals
at the GPS L1 frequency over the air, which would have
violated FCC restrictions on transmitting in a protected
band. An interval of digitized authentic GPS L1 C/A
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code data sampled at 5.7 MHz was stored to disk. The
data were input to the receiver-spoofer, which tracked the
6 GPS signals present, generated corresponding spoofing
signals, and combined these into a 1-bit quantized out-
put bitstream. The output bitstream was then combined
with the original data by interleaving, and the resulting
bitstream was input to a Cornell GRID receiver acting as
target receiver. A schematic of the demonstration setup is
given in Fig. 10.
Combiner
Bit
Stream
Spoofed
Target GPS Receiver
Authentic
Correlation Function
GPS Receiver/Spoofer
Spoofing signal
Authentic signal
read from disk
Fig. 10. The “bit combination” framework for demonstrating a
spoofing attack.
The receiver-spoofer accurately reproduced the code
phase, frequency, data bit values, and relative amplitude of
all 6 GPS L1 signals present. The spoofing signals’ carrier
phases, while not designed to match those of the genuine
signals, were continuous across accumulation intervals as
intended.
To enable observation of the spoofing attack, the target
GRID receiver was augmented with correlator taps at 81
different 0.2-chip offsets about the prompt tap, which is
nominally aligned with the incoming signal. The ampli-
tude time history from each correlator tap can be com-
bined to produce “footage” of the spoofing attack from
the perspective of the individual channels.
Figure 11 shows a sequence of frames depicting the attack
on one of the channels. The attack lasts approximately
30 seconds. Each successive panel represents a snapshot
of the 81 taps’ amplitudes at roughly 6-second intervals.
The three red dots represent the delay-lock loop’s track-
ing points, which continuously attempt to align themselves
so that the center point is maximized and the flanking
points are equalized. The first (top) frame shows the track-
ing points nicely aligned on the genuine signal’s correla-
tion peak, while the counterfeit signal’s peak approaches
furtively from the right. Of course, in a typical spoof-
ing attack, the counterfeit peak would simply be initially
aligned with the genuine peak and initially smaller than
the counterfeit peak in the top panel; its approach from
the right and large size in the present case is merely for
clarity of presentation.
After the spoofed peak aligns with the genuine one, its sig-
nal power is gradually increased until it begins to control
the tracking points. Eventually, the counterfeit peak drags
the tracking points off to the left of the true peak. In the
lower two panels of Fig. 11, the true peak appears to drift
Fig. 11. A sequence of frames (from top to bottom) showing a
successful single-channel spoofing attack.
off towards the right because the counterfeit peak has hi-
jacked the 81 taps of the figure’s image zone, which are
tied to the victim receiver’s tracking points, and it drags
them all leftward relative to the true peak. A sophisticated
spoofing attack will attempt right-to-left, or late-to-early,
tracking lift-off wherever possible so as to disguise the at-
tack as multipath.
Figure 12 illustrates the attack from the perspective of the
baseband phasors in the complex plane. In the present ver-
sion of the receiver-spoofer, no attempt is made to phase-
align the authentic and spoofing signals. Consequently, a
sign change in the data bit stream is possible as the spoof-
ing phasor’s amplitude gradually increases and the tar-
get receiver’s phase-lock loop eventually transitions from
tracking the authentic phasor to tracking the spoofing pha-
sor. However, the rotational rates of the two phasors, ωa
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Fig. 12. The authentic and spoofing baseband phasors with respec-
tive rotational rates of ωa and ωs on the complex I-Q plane.
and ωs in Fig. 12, should be nearly equivalent. From Fig.
12 it should be apparent that if a receiver-spoofer were ca-
pable of phase-aligning with a genuine signal, it could, by
transmitting the exact difference between a desired spoof-
ing signal and the true signal at the target antenna, si-
multaneously produce a spoofing phasor and suppress the
authentic phasor. When combined with data bit predic-
tion, such an attack could be impossible to detect relying
solely on user-equipment-based defenses.
VI. SPOOFING COUNTERMEASURES SUG-
GESTED BY WORK TO DATE
Three spoofing countermeasures have been suggested by
work to date. Two of these, both software-defined user-
equipment-based defenses, are presented here. These can
be thought of as additions to Keys’s five user-equipment-
based countermeasures presented in Section I. The third
method, a promising low-impact cryptographic technique,
will be disclosed in a separate publication. Neither of the
user-equipment-based defenses discussed below is spoof-
proof; however, each is straightforward to implement and
increases the difficulty of mounting a successful spoofing
attack.
A. Data Bit Latency Defense
The data bit latency defense is premised on the difficulty,
discussed in Section III-B.4, of re-transmitting the GPS
data bits in real time. The alternative, data-bit predic-
tion, is itself somewhat challenging and is vulnerable to
detection at the 2-hour ephemeris update boundaries and
when a GPS satellite rises above the horizon.
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n
Fig. 13. Illustration of the likely latency of the spoofing data bit
stream compared to the authentic data bit stream.
Figure 13 illustrates the latency between the spoofing and
authentic data bit streams that would arise in the absence
of data bit prediction. To detect this condition, the target
receiver has only to continuously monitor bit lock. In other
words, the receiver looks for a data bit sign change between
consecutive accumulations at the C/A code-length inter-
val. If a sign change is detected at other than an expected
data bit boundary, then the target receiver raises a flag.
Except in unusual circumstances, such as low signal power
or ionospheric scintillation, a raised flag betrays a spoofing
attack. The data bit latency defense has been implemented
and validated on a modified Cornell GRID receiver.
Besides by data bit prediction, a spoofer can attempt to
counter the data bit latency defense by jamming until the
target receiver loses bit lock and then spoofing during re-
acquisition. However, as with the time discrepancy defense
mentioned in Section II-A, an extended jamming period
may be required to sufficiently widen the target receiver’s
window of acceptance, and extended jamming is itself tell-
tale evidence of interference.
B. Vestigial Signal Defense
The vestigial signal defense is premised on the difficulty
of suppressing the authentic signal after successful lift-off
of the delay-lock loop tracking points. To suppress the
authentic signal, a spoofer must transmit the difference
between a desired spoofing signal and the true signal at
the target antenna, as discussed in Section V. Construc-
tion of an effective suppressor signal requires knowledge
to within roughly 1/8 of a cycle of each authentic signal’s
carrier phase at the phase center of the target antenna.
Such precise knowledge of carrier phase implies cm-level
knowledge of the 3-dimensional vector between the target
antenna and the transmitter phase centers. This would
be challenging except in circumstances where the receiver-
spoofer could be placed in the immediate proximity of the
target antenna phase center.
Absent an effective suppressor signal, a vestige of the au-
thentic GPS signal will remain in the input to the target
receiver. Soon after lift-off of the delay-lock loop track-
ing points, the vestige may be well disguised as multipath,
but its persistence and distance from the spoofed correla-
tor peak will eventually distinguish the two effects.
To detect the vestigial authentic signal, the target receiver
employs the following software-defined technique. First,
the receiver copies the incoming digitized front-end data
into a buffer used only for vestigial detection. Next, the
receiver selects one of the GPS signals being tracked and
removes this signal from the data in the buffer. This is the
same technique used to remove strong signals in combating
the near/far problem in spread spectrum multiple access
systems, including GPS [18]. Once the tracked signal has
been removed, the receiver performs acquisition for the
same signal (same PRN identifier) on the buffered data.
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These steps are repeated for the same GPS signal and the
results are summed non-coherently until a probability of
detection threshold is met for some assumed C/N0 value
and some desired probability of false alarm. If a significant
vestigial signal is present in the data, this technique will
reveal it.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The deepening dependence of the civil infrastructure on
GPS and the potential for financial gain or high-profile
mischief makes civil GPS spoofing a gathering threat. The
software-defined receiver-spoofer that has been developed
and is described in this paper demonstrates that it is
straightforward to mount a spoofing attack that would
defeat most known user-equipment-based spoofing coun-
termeasures. Moreover, it appears that nothing short of
cryptographic authentication can guard against a sophis-
ticated spoofing attack.
With the addition of each modernized GNSS signal (e.g.,
GPS L2C, L5, Galileo, and Glonass), the cost of mounting
a spoofing attack rises markedly, and would quickly exceed
the capabilities of the GPS L1 civil spoofer demonstrated
here. Nonetheless, faster DSPs or FPGAs would make
multi-signal attacks possible. What is more, there will
remain many single-frequency L1 C/A code receivers in
critical applications for years to come.
It is imperative that more research and funds be devoted
to developing and testing practical and effective user-
equipment-based civil GPS spoofing countermeasures such
as the data bit latency defense and the vestigial signal
defense introduced in this paper. Further research into
cryptographic authentication methods should also be pur-
sued. Officials in the U.S. Department of Transportation,
the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Department
of Homeland Security should be persuaded to consider
the perils of civil GPS spoofing and to oversee develop-
ment and adoption of effective countermeasures. Commer-
cial manufacturers of GPS user equipment should be per-
suaded to adopt at least the rudimentary spoofing coun-
termeasures mentioned in this paper and in the references.
In conclusion, consider the following two “security max-
ims” advanced by the Vulnerability Assessment Team at
Argonne National Laboratory [19]. The first maxim cer-
tainly applies to civil GPS spoofing. One can only hope
that the second maxim does not.
Yippee Maxim: There are effective, simple, & low-
cost countermeasures (at least partial countermeasures) to
many vulnerabilities.
Show Me Maxim: No serious security vulnerability, in-
cluding blatantly obvious ones, will be dealt with until
there is overwhelming evidence and widespread recognition
that adversaries have already catastrophically exploited it.
In other words, “significant psychological (or literal) dam-
age is required before any significant security changes will
be made.”
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